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he Army Oral History Project was
assigned to us by Mr. Walter W.
Hollis, FS, Deputy Under Secretary
of the Army (Operations Research) in the
winter-spring of 1992. The journal, Military
Operations Research (volume 19, number 1,
2014), includes an introduction describing
the ArmyOral History Project, underwhich
George Schecter’s oral history was pro-
duced. George passed away shortly after I
conducted the interview in 1992.
As we prepared this oral history for pub-
lication by MORS, we contacted George’s
daughter Ellen Schecter. Ellen is a writer,
producer, and educator. She has published
more than 20 books and collaborated on
many award-winning TV series, including
Reading Rainbow. Ellen’s memoir, Fierce Joy,
available on Amazon.com, explores her
childhood and her father’s strong influence
on her. Ellen volunteered to write some
memories about her father that provide
valuable context to George’s oral history.
Mr. E. B. Vandiver, FS, who was the Director
of the Center for ArmyAnalysis (CAA) from
October 1, 1984 thru October 31, 2012, also
knew George Schecter personally and has
written introductory comments. Dr. Bob
Sheldon, FS, whom I mentored in the
MORS Oral History Program starting in
1998, helped edit this oral history.
INTRODUCTION TO THE ORAL
HISTORY OF MR. GEORGE
SCHECTER, FS
by Mr. E. B. Vandiver, FS
The editors of the MORS oral histories
sometimes ask me to review the drafts,
especially those of the early MORSians
with whom I might have been acquainted.
Such was the case with this one by George
Schecter, FS, one of the pioneers in both
Army Operations Research and MORS.
George was a longtime friend of Walt
Hollis, FS, having been his coworker at
Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia when
they were starting their careers. George
periodically visited Walt in the Pentagon
and would invariably swing by my office
on these visits. Sometimes we took him
to lunch at the Secretary of the Army’s
mess, enjoying the fellowship and his in-
telligent conversation and endless stream
of ideas and anecdotes.
George had a long and varied career. He
waswell educated in physics andmathemat-
ics, and in a long career applied them to
a wide array of difficult technical problems.
He was a problem solver. He did not think
of himself in terms of operations research,
but he had all the requisite attitudes and
qualities. He was typical of the founding
generation of operations researchers: smart,
broadly educated, curious, articulate, data
driven, experimentallyminded, and focused
on the operational needs of the users. Hewas
industrious, inventive, and modest, with
a keen sense of humor. He was a pleasure
to know and to have as a professional associ-
ate. He sacrificedmuch for his career and his
country, losing an eye in the course of early
experiments with recoilless weapons, but
he never complained. He was truly one of
the Greatest Generation.
The last years of his professional life he
kept alive the dim flame of urbanwarfare in
an era when the military foolishly claimed
that that we would never do that again.
He studied the development of modern ur-
ban sprawl, developing categories of urban
terrain and appropriate concepts, doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures. He influ-
enced Dr. Wilbur Payne, FS, then in
Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), to instigate a joint urban war-
fare modeling effort with our ABCA Allies
(America, Britain, Canada, Australia), which
kept some modest analytical effort con-
tinuing in the Army analytical community
despite official indifference.
The Gulf War in 1990–1991 brought
about changed attitudes. There was some
urban fighting in northern Saudi Arabia
and fear thatwemight have to fight through
Kuwait City and other urban areas further
north in Iraq. Official interest revived, and
by the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003 urban warfare had been reintegrated
within the Army under the revised name
of Military Operations in Urban Terrain
(MOUT).
I attended a readiness briefing in early
2003 in the Army’s Operations Center prior
to the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
which, among other things, itemized equip-
ment needs in support of urban warfare. I
recall battleaxes, battering rams, grappling
hooks and lines, wrecking bars, and scaling
ladders. This could have been William the
Conqueror’s shopping list. It certainly was
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PERSONAL MEMORIES OF MY
FATHER, GEORGE SCHECTER
by Ellen Schecter
Reading this document is like hearing my
father’s voice from another room. Words he
often used, and lived by, stick out of the conver-
sation like raisins in a cookie: gumption, profes-
sional, initiative, a sense of purpose.
He always patiently explained complex
ideas to me, from the Pythagorean Theorem to
Kepler’s Music of the Spheres. He showed me
with pencil on paper how his pet name for
me—Nelle—was a palindrome: my name
spelled backward. I can still watch him make
an orange and apple orbit the lamp over our
kitchen table to illustrate how Earth and Venus
circle the sun. ‘‘I wish I had nine hands,’’ he
joked, ‘‘so I could show you how all the planets
in the Solar System circle the sun.’’ Pluto was
considered a planet then.
And just as he always reached higher pro-
fessionally, he always encouraged me to do the
same. At 14, when I wanted to be a nurse, he
said, ‘‘Whynot a doctor?Andwork in ahospital,
see how you like it.’’ As a Candy Striper, I wept
every night, discovering medicine wasn’t for
me. But when I won a national contest with
a poem, I decided to be a writer. ‘‘Good choice,’’
he said, and gave me a silver pencil on a chain. I
still have it. His encouragement helped forge
my career. And I still write almost every day
of my life.
High-Speed Motion Pictures
One of my earliest memories is watching
high-speed motion pictures of a drop of cream
falling into a cup of black coffee. My father
and his colleagues would hang a sheet over
the large window in our living room. My father
lets me watch if I’m quiet.
Then we watch one drop of cream splash
into a cup of coffee over and over. And every
time the drop falls, a white crown springs up
out of the coffee: a queen’s crownwith toomany
beautiful white spikes to count—each with
a white pearl at the tip. The points reach ever
higher—then fall back into the coffee. Then the
film flaps, and the projector makes a boring
white eye on our wall.
The men got very excited, but I couldn’t un-
derstand anything they said. I have no idea
what they were investigating—I still don’t. But
we watched it again and again. And when I
had questions, my father answered all of them,
including why a high-speed motion picture
slows everything down, and why the crown
looks almost the same every time, and why we
can’t see it when it isn’t in the movie.
His Accident
You know the public story of the recoilless
rifle explosion. How, in early 1944, it exploded
as my father and a colleague were testing it in
subzero conditions at the Frankford Arsenal.
But there are stories behind that story: he didn’t
wear his protective gear that day; shrapnel was
embedded all over his upper body; his right eye
was immediately destroyed. For weeks he was
packed in sand bags at Wills Eye Hospital in
Philadelphia in order to prevent damage to his
left eye. My eight-months pregnant mother
(with me) sat by his side to feed, read, cheer,
and sing to him.
But the deeper meaning of this story is what
happened after this: My father went back to
work as soon as he could. Nothing stopped
him from using his mind and going forward
with his career.
I remember how it frightenedme every time
he disappeared into ‘‘the hospital.’’ What was
a hospital? Will he ever come home? Each time,
it felt as if the world changed from Technicolor
to black-and-white.
There were dozens of surgeries, but he
never stopped doing the work that engaged
him so fully. He never said to me as a young
child what his work meant to him; he simply
picked himself off and went on doing it. Those
actions spoke so clearly to me that many years
later, when I was diagnosed with a chronic neu-
rological disease, I followed his model: I refused
to give up my work, and even though I was un-
able to continue my career writing children’s
television—the deadlines were too taxing—to
this day I work nearly every day, writing book
after book. My father was my role model: he
demonstrated the crucial importance of gump-
tion, professionalism, initiative, and maintain-
ing a sense of purpose.
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The Military-Industrial Complex
In the sixties, I felt torn over my father’s
continued creation of war materiel and my fer-
vent antiwar stance. The Vietnam War hit me
hard: my adorable high school boyfriend was
killed, and so was my roommate’s fiance´. I
knew my dad had a very tender conscience
and suffered over all the casualties, but we
never discussed these conflicts directly.
When I told my parents I planned to go to
the 1967 March on the Pentagon, knowing my
dad was a frequent visitor, my mother warned,
‘‘If you go, you’ll jeopardize your father’s job
and high-level security clearance.’’
‘‘I’d like to march,’’ I told my dad, ‘‘but I
don’t want you to suffer for my convictions.’’
‘‘Ellen, you have to follow your conscience,’’
he said. ‘‘Your right to march against this terrible
war is guaranteed by the First Amendment. If
your protest means I’ll be punished, then I
shouldn’t work for Uncle Sam.’’ He kissed my
forehead. ‘‘Go, sweetheart. Don’t be muzzled
by fear. I wish I could march myself.’’
I took him at his word and hugged him for
his generosity.
And—I marched. For both of us.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH ORAL
HISTORY PROJECT INTERVIEW OF
MR. GEORGE SCHECTER, FS
Mr. George Schecter was on the Military Op-
erations Research Society (MORS) Board of Di-
rectors from 1973 to 1977. He was elected a MORS
Fellow of the Society (FS) in 1992. Mr. Schecter
was a program director at the Battelle Institute
and a former official of the Army’s Frankford
Arsenal in Philadelphia. Mr. Gene Visco, FS,
and Dr. Jim Williams conducted the interview
in Arlington, Virginia, on May 15, 1992.
Mr. Schecter passed away on July 23, 1992.
George Schecter: Shall I just go ahead and an-
swer these questions?
Jim Williams: Please.
George Schecter: I was born in 1917 and raised
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I was educated at
TempleUniversity and got a bachelor’s degree in
physics. I have to tell you right at the beginning
that I don’t think I was ever identified as an op-
erations researcher or an operations analyst for-
mally, and that may be true of a lot of people.
I was very much influenced by my brother,
five years older than myself. He got into the
physics curriculum and I followed. He pre-
cededme by five years andwewent to the same
undergraduate school. He got his PhD from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
One of the most important courses I ever took
was a one-semester course in logic, and I really
believe this has a lot to dowith how I became in-
terested in operations research (OR) and opera-
tions analysis (OA). An interesting incident was
that I went to the library one day while I was
taking this logic course. I took out a book that
had not been taken out since my brother last
took it out. [Laughter] There was a lot of resent-
fulness, at least at the very beginning. Our con-
tact was practically nil at that time. Hewas up in
Boston going to MIT, so it wasn’t his influence
that drove me to the book.
Jim Williams:When did you first start work-
ing for the Army?
George Schecter: 1941, right out of school.
Jim Williams: Who was that with at that
time?
George Schecter: It was the Frankford Arse-
nal Pittman-Dunn Laboratories in Philadelphia.
Gene Visco: How did you get recruited? You
graduated from —
George Schecter: I didn’t actually graduate at
that time, but I had to get a job and I went to
night school and graduated a year or so later. I
applied to many places, including industry.
This place just appealed to me; actually, the
place didn’t appeal, the people appealed to
me. Dr. William J. ‘‘Bill’’ Kroeger and Dr. Herschel
Smith interviewed me. I was a young snip
and I could just feel something very important
there.
Gene Visco: And World War II was just
starting.
George Schecter: Yes, in 1941.
Jim Williams: Did these people manifest an
excitement to work?
George Schecter: Absolutely. It did instill ex-
citement and it was contagious. One of the
things I would have liked some time to do is
look at the way the Army functions now and
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compare it with thewaywe did things and see if
we can’t recover some of that. We were abso-
lutely productivity driven. We didn’t call it that;
we just wanted to do a good job and generally
did a good job.
I spent at least the first third of my profes-
sional career in hardware research and develop-
ment (R&D).When Imatured after a few years, I
started to ask the question, where do the re-
quirements come from? Who says it should be
this long, this big, this many pounds, this veloc-
ity and so forth?
I remember enjoying being that kind of
a maverick in our community of engineers and
developers. In fact, I was sort of a nuisance at
times because I tried to find the origins of those
requirements. Some years later I realized that I
had to talk to the user, the guy who was going
to use this piece of equipment, whatever it
was. At that time there was a wall between the
developer and the user. In order to talk to the
user you had to go all the way up to general of-
ficer level and all the way down again, and I
thought thatwas dumb. So Imade direct contact
with the user when I was developing a piece of
equipment.
I felt a need to have that linkage to the user
because otherwise I couldn’t get the answer to
where did the requirements originate. So I
started to break rules to make these contacts.
In fact, I have to tell you proudly, they wrote lo-
cal regulations to prevent me from making that
contact.
I think what’s important is that we’re drift-
ing back in that direction. In fact, that’s one of
the things thatWalt Hollis mentioned tome yes-
terday afternoon. I talked to him about the new
science and technology (S&T) strategy. He said
one of his objections is the way it’s being orga-
nized and managed. It tends to further separate
particularly tech base work from the user, and
we agree that’s very bad.
In those early years, one of the most impor-
tant things to me was the recoilless rifle that I
had a hand in developing. It was not totally
original. It was really borrowed from the Ger-
mans. We captured a German recoilless gun
and we just made it a lot better, like cut the
weight, and got much greater range and much
greater performance.
Jim Williams: Was that a 57 millimeter?
George Schecter: 57 was the original one, but
also 75, 90, 105, 106. In fact, the 90 millimeter re-
coilless gun is a good example. Just like any sys-
tem, and particularly in any gun, it’s very
simple to be able to say if you add an inch to
the tube length you get a little additional veloc-
ity and it will cost you a little additional weight.
Of course, that has a declining payoff, but still
there’s payoff.
I remember clearly going down to the 82nd
Airborne Division and elbowing my way into
the Commanding General’s (CG’s) office, and
showing him a mockup of what we were devel-
oping, and explaining to him this tradeoff and
asking him where he wanted it. Are you willing
to pay a couple more inches for 10 more feet per
second and a little additional hit probability? I
got a very sensible answer. He took me out into
the field. He had men jumping out of airplanes,
parachuting down. You could see that length
was a very important feature to them, a very im-
portant simple mechanical feature. I got some
pretty good answers and I really felt good about
having done it that way.
Gene Visco: Who was the CG?
George Schecter: The CG was a man with
a lisp. [Editor’s note: George probably referred to
General Matthew Ridgeway who was CG of the
82nd Airborne Division from June 26, 1942 to Au-
gust 27, 1944.] I remember sitting in his office
and briefing him and his people and having
a discussion and I remember him saying, ‘‘Okay,
Mr. Schecter, now we’re going to go out and
jump.’’ [Laughter] For an instant, I thought he
meant me. Quite a shock.
Gene Visco: Did you get overseas during
World War II?
George Schecter: During World War II, not at
all.
Gene Visco: You were working principally
with officers and military?
George Schecter: Yes, at Fort Benning, Geor-
gia and Fort Sill, Oklahoma and the 82nd Air-
borne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Jim Williams: Did you find that the cus-
tomers were generally receptive?
George Schecter: Oh, they were receptive.
Theywere grateful. Theywere so removed from
this by the bureaucratic process that they were
extremely receptive, although there was danger
to that. If you talked to a major, he had
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a particular characteristic that was important to
him. You had to be careful not to be driven by
one guy’s opinion. That was a hazard. In fact,
that’s the hazard against which the regulations
were intended to operate. So you had to be care-
ful. You had to be sure that you went back and
did the arithmetic, sent it back, got it okayed,
but looked at the whole. To me that was the or-
igin of what I would call OR—simple tradeoff of
physical characteristics, performance character-
istics, and operational characteristics.
Although these tradeoffs seem extremely
simple to us now, it was practically unknown
that they were negotiable. The user would write
a requirement and that became gospel, and that
requirement was probably written by a couple
of captains and majors sitting around a table
and coming up with their best notions. They
had no way to do the tradeoff or to even know
that a tradeoff existed. That was a very exciting
thing for me. Just to know that you could do it
was really exciting.
After a few years, I became responsible for
all the R&D for the recoilless weapons and I also
concurrently became responsible for the devel-
opment of all aircrew escape systems. In World
War II, somebody shot down a German Stuka
dive bomber and sent us some paraphernalia
that was attached to the seat. This thing looked
like a gun. It turned out to be a pilot ejection
seat, a gun that shoots the pilot out of the air-
plane. And that’s how it came to us.
Jim Williams: Was that also with the
Pittman-Dunn Laboratories?
George Schecter: Yes.
Jim Williams: So you were doing a range of
things?
George Schecter: Yes. I happened to get both
of those responsibilities after a time.
I got the notion thatwewere very successful
in saving aircrews. We had a scoreboard up on
the wall, and every time we saved a life we
put a mark on it. Then during Vietnam, helicop-
ter pilots were getting knocked down. So I de-
cided we ought to try to do something about
that. We bootlegged some money and we devel-
oped what we called an L-shaped trajectory.
You can’t eject the pilot up through the copter
blades. You can’t even knock the blades off
and then eject him up. It’s just too hazardous
and you lose stability.
So we decided to eject him sideways, hori-
zontally, and then propel him upward with
a rocket. The rule of the game was that in an air-
craft of any kind either on the deck, or one inch
above the ground, we must be able to save the
crew. There has to be enough clearance from
the ground to open the chute and come down
safely. We developed this system and we used
it on a piece of iron and it worked.
Later, I went to see an Army officer in the
Pentagon who had just come back from Viet-
nam.Hewas involved in the analysis of helicop-
ter casualties and he just seemed like the right
guy to talk to. I described this ejection system
to him and he discouraged me. First of all, it
would add a lot of weight and a lot of cost. I
tried to use the argument about the mothers
and wives of these damaged or destroyed men
are just as important as the Air Force and Army
aviation people. But the way he discouragedme
was to say he did an analysis of helicopter casu-
alties in terms of the flight profile of the helicop-
ter pilot as a function of changes in the air
defense systems. He was able to show me that
the casualty rate remained constant even when
anti-aircraft systems improved.
What he said to me was that by some mech-
anism he didn’t quite understand, except just
the pooling of experience of pilots in their en-
gagements, they kept the casualty level pretty
darn constant over large changes in air defense
system capabilities. They simply learned either
to use greater standoff distances or in some
way different flight profiles, and they kept that
casualty rate at about 2 or 3 percent, pretty con-
stant over big changes in the air defense. That
was a revelation to me.
Gene Visco: So his point was that adding
this complicated process would not have a
significant—
George Schecter: You’re right, Gene, the cost
and the weight—it would not be a simple, easy
system to put on. So that never happened. It
never was adopted.
Gene Visco: One of the things that’s always
been confusing to me is the Army arsenal sys-
tem that we have. We had, what, a half a dozen
of them or so?
George Schecter: About that.
Gene Visco: And each one had a specific
arena.
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George Schecter: Pittman-Dunn Laboratories
had a strange combination. It had small caliber
guns. It had artillery ammunition and it had fire
control for tanks and fire control for artillery. It
had a very prolific gang of people. We also were
developers of the variable time (VT) fuze.
I was a lucky guy to be in a place like that
with such a variety of things going on. I was also
very lucky to have bosses that were superb.
Theywere technically great. Theywere three di-
mensional, human, and I was a lucky man.
JimWilliams:Whowere some of those folks?
George Schecter: Dr. Bill Kroeger was my
boss. He was a good physicist, a good engineer,
a good country-style manager. OR didn’t mean
a thing to him, except he did it all the time. He
just did it. Dr. Herschel Smith, who was Bill’s
boss, was the top civilian scientist, the same
kind ofman,with all thosewonderful character-
istics. They raised me.
Gene Visco: What were some of the other
arsenals?
George Schecter: There was Rock Island Ar-
senal, which is mostly artillery systems, recu-
perator systems, gun systems, mounts, and
recoil mechanisms. There was Watervliet Arse-
nal, which was gun tube design and fabrication.
Jim Williams: That was in New York?
George Schecter: Yes, near Albany. They de-
veloped this heat treatment system that was un-
known in the rest of the world. They have these
deep pits where they can do heat treatment.
They developed some exceptional heat treating
facilities for early gun systems.
TheWatervliet Arsenal designed and devel-
oped the gun tubes themselves. They maxi-
mized strength and minimized weight for the
function that the gun tube performed.
Then there was Springfield Armory, the
small arms system people up in Springfield,
Massachusetts.
Gene Visco: An armory and an arsenal, not
much difference apparently?
George Schecter: No, I think not. Redstone
was an arsenal.
Gene Visco: What were they doing in those
days?
George Schecter: Mostly rockets.
Gene Visco: It sounds like the arsenals had to
relate to one another because if Rock Island was
designing recoil systems and mechanisms, and
the guys in Watervliet are making the tubes,
and you guys were working propulsion, you
somehow had to get together.
George Schecter: Oh, yes. We did talk to each
other. I can remembermany visits that I made to
Rock Island and to Springfield, not much to
Redstone. They were sort of competitors. They
were coming in with rockets, where we knew—
[Laughter] rockets were a passing fancy.
But we talked to each other. Picatinny was
a major arsenal.
Gene Visco: What were they doing?
George Schecter: They had responsibility for
all warheads, and they had the responsibility
for artillery ammunition systems. They also
had a responsibility for mines and demolitions
even at that time. And, yes, we talked to each
other. We sometimes fought with each other.
That was a competition, sometimes fair, some-
times unfair, but we did. We had to talk to each
other.
As a matter of fact, in about 1968 or 1969,
they wanted to close out the small arms ammu-
nition activity from Frankford. The thought was
that since Springfield has the weapon, give
them the ammunition so they have the whole
system. That never happened.
There was somewhere between 15 and 20
years when I started into the OR/OA kind of
thinking more systematically, more broadly.
Jim Williams: That would have been from
1941 into the early 1960s that you were primar-
ily involved in the hardware development.
George Schecter: That’s right.
Gene Visco: Can you touch on some other
systems through the 1940s and 1950s that were
the same thinking? You talked about the recoil-
less rifle.
George Schecter: There were about eight dif-
ferent recoilless rifles and each of them had
the same kinds of tradeoffs.
I was involved in hardware development
pretty heavily during that whole period. I was
involved in aircrew escape system development
during the second half of that period. I was in-
volved, not as a leader, but as part of the team
in the development of the first computer to be
fielded by the Army. It was the Field Artillery
Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC).
That was a successful project. It went in the
field. It lived longer than it was ever anticipated
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to live in the field. But as soon as we standard-
ized it and delivered it, we started to think of
what else we could do with it. We decided to
use the computer as a diagnostic system for au-
tomotive equipment, and we developed a thing
call MAIDS, Multi-Purpose Automatic Inspec-
tion and Diagnostic System. The computer
was a rarity, but still we wanted to think about
what else we could do with this thing.
So we developed a system that with a har-
ness of sensors you could put a tank or a jeep
or some other vehicle with an internal combus-
tion engine on it and run it without moving. You
could operate this system and put these sensors
at different locations, like a temperature sensor
for the manifold and a pressure sensor for the
cylinder, and so forth, a set of perhaps a dozen
or more sensors and just run right to the end
point. You would start the engine, run it for five
or 10minutes, the computer would do the accel-
erating and decelerating, and at the end point
you would get a printed sheet that said, ‘‘You’re
going to need rings in the fourth cylinder in
about 10,000 miles if you’re not careful and
you better check the starter mechanism.’’
The interesting thing about this was the
gumption to take something that was designed
for a specific purpose, and apparently did well
at that purpose in a new technology at that time,
and look for other applications. I guess it’s to be
expected, but it’s exciting.
We took the same computer and converted
it into an inspection and diagnostic system for
Army automotive equipment. It is not a test
set because a test set tells you that if the value
being measured is above or below a certain
value, it’s out of the range and it’s no good. This
was diagnostic. In other words, it could look at
things within the range of acceptability and
combine them logically and tell you that there
may be something wrong, although no one ele-
ment is out of the range of required perfor-
mance. It was a very early application of that
kind.
Jim Williams: What was the driving force to
undertake finding additional uses?
George Schecter: It was the guy who headed
the team thatdeveloped the system,RayBrachman.
I was just part of his team.
Jim Williams: Do you know what led him to
think we ought to do something like this?
George Schecter: My recollection is there
was a heck of a lot of excitement. It was the
first digital computer ever fielded by the
Army, and that was so exciting that Ray, with
some help, but he was the driver, said there
must be good things that we can do with this
piece of technology. In fact, this embodiment
of this piece of technology could do other
things.
Jim Williams: Did that strike people as an
odd notion?
George Schecter: Not the technical people in
our organization, except some of the bureau-
crats. It was that kind of place.
It was a successful project that could have
been just let go, and we would have gotten
medals for it as it was. It was not an externally
imposed need. It was an initiative and I give
Ray credit for that. It wasn’t driven by having
to make a better return. It was an investment
and that return was assured. It’s the environ-
ment of the place that allowed him to think that
way. He was not a senior guy, but the manage-
ment was of the nature that it didn’t pooh pooh
these ideas, and people had to feel that, to even
be able to think of it.
Anyway, it turned out to be very successful.
It turned into a multimillion dollar develop-
ment project, which was great from our stand-
point, and it was successful for the Army. In
fact, we ran an experiment with 18 tanks that
were being brought out of the field for repairs
and we split the sample into two: nine tanks
and nine tanks. Nine tanks went through the
shop through the regular assessment and repair
system, and the other nine went through this
new system. Something like 50 percent of the
costs of the repairs were unnecessary. The car-
buretor coughed, you threw the thing in the
ash can and put a new carburetor on. You didn’t
replace the 10-cent spring that would have
made it well again.My recollection is something
like 50 percent of the repair costs were unneces-
sary. Now just imagine what your civilian shops
are like. [Laughter]
Jim Williams: Did that result in changes in
the maintenance and the logistics pipeline?
George Schecter: Oh, yes. It did that, and it
was adopted, but it did more than that. At least
in part it opened up the field of automatic in-
spection diagnostics, which became huge.
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Years later, every complex system that was
being developed also was developing an in-
spection and diagnostic system. Ray came up
with the idea that we were wasting billions of
dollars into the future by making each diagnos-
tic inspection system unique to that system. The
functions are the same. You have transducers
and processors telling you something and they
could be made modular and multi-applicable;
but the industry killed it. It would cut out
a big chunk of profit. I helped him to fight that
fight, but we just couldn’t beat it.
Gene Visco: You mentioned extensive work
primarily during World War II. Can you think
of anything specifically through the Korean
War period that was different because we in-
creased the sizes? The Army also got into infan-
try rockets and antitank equipment.
George Schecter: Yes. One of the most impor-
tant things we did was to make the subsequent
models of the recoilless rifle fin-stabilized so
that the rotation of the shaped-charge warhead
would not degrade its penetration performance.
That was around that period.
We made lots of marginal improvements.
We improved steels. We made everything ligh-
ter. But thatwas a pretty fundamental difference
to make this high-explosive antitank (HEAT)
round fin-stabilized so that it has good penetra-
tion performance.
The reductions in weight and the increases
in performance were 10 to 15 to 20 percent
gains, so they were not radical. But when you
went from a spinning shaped charge projectile
to a fin-stabilized shaped charge projectile,
that was doubling, tripling, or quadrupling
penetration.
Gene Visco: When we first got involved in
Korea, one of the principal antitank weapons
was the 2.75 inch rocket which was totally inef-
fectual, even against the older Russian tanks
that the North Koreans were using.
George Schecter: We went to the Light Anti-
tank Weapon (LAW) for the infantry weapon.
But we did go to larger elements. I remember
having a big fight that I lost with Huntsville
Missile Command. We had a recoilless ap-
proach to the LAW requirement, and we had
pretty good proof that the range, accuracy and
penetration were superior to this LAW rocket.
They won the fight on the grounds that there
were so many tens of thousands of warheads
in inventory for the LAW that they could deliver
the LAW to the field at a much lower cost, and
when it was all over the LAW rockets were
trashed anyway. That’s a frustration.
Jim Williams: That wasn’t the 2.75 inch, was
it?
George Schecter: I think it might have been
2.75 because these warheads were stocked
from other uses, I think aircraft uses, and we
knew they were ineffective. But we lost the
argument.
Another thing that just occurred to me
is about eight or nine years ago there were
several ideas for the improvement of the
tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
(TOW) antitankmissile. Therewere about seven
major kinds of improvements that were techni-
cally feasible and we undertook to evaluate
them comparatively, because the budget
couldn’t afford to do all of them and the com-
plexity might be too great to do all of them.
The thing that we did to make it realistic was
to look downstream at the likely time each of
these would be fielded, and the likely interval
of time that they would be in the field and what
the composition of the enemy tank force would
be in those intervals.
We looked at not just the sheer improve-
ment in hit probability or kill probability, but
against the mix of tank targets that they would
have to deal with. It turned out very well. In ad-
dition to cost and performance, the contempo-
rary threat was also very valuable for us to
allocate the assets in time and quantity to do
those TOW improvements. That may be a rou-
tine thing, but it struck me as a very practical
way to do it. It was practical from the standpoint
that you designed it for the best vehicle of its
contemporary period.
Jim Williams: You worked for about 20 years
in hardware development, and then into these
other types of problems. What occasioned that
transition? Was that an abrupt thing or did it
occur slowly?
George Schecter: No, it was ramp up, ramp
down, with very gradual ramps. It just hap-
pened. There was no turning point for me. I just
got more andmore involved. It was a very grad-
ual process. I never really got out of the hard-
ware business entirely.
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Jim Williams: Did you stay in the same posi-
tions or were there organizational changes or
transfers involved?
George Schecter: At Frankford I changed
from a project engineer responsible for specific
pieces of hardware, to a propellant-actuated de-
vices mission manager. Then I got flipped over
into an organization at the headquarters—the
Plans and Analysis Directorate.
Gene Visco: This was in the 1960s?
George Schecter: Yes. If anything, that
marked the switchover. It was the end of a long
reign.
Jim Williams: Was there any particular
person that was tied to that transition to the
Plans and Analysis Directorate? Were you
recruited?
George Schecter: Therewas a need for that or-
ganization to come into being at the headquar-
ters, which is a recognition of the value of
plans and analysis. The directorate was formed
and my boss said, ‘‘We’re going to have to work
with those guys. You better take it.’’ That was an
upgrade.
Gene Visco: I became active in that period.
There was a relatively widespread movement
of creating planning and analysis groups of var-
ious types in a lot of Army installations.
George Schecter: Where do you place that in
time?
Gene Visco: Somewhere in the middle 1950s.
People began to think more of the way they
managed the resources and the fact that you
couldn’t do everything that needed to be done,
and you needed some way to keep an eye on
that. I’m not exactly sure what prompted it.
George Schecter:Most importantly, there was
another pressure—the different laboratories
themselves like the fire control laboratory, the
ballistics laboratory, and the other laboratories
were competing for dollars. You had to prove
your case, and I think that the need to prove
your case was part of that pressure. It may have
been started by one of them and the others had
to join.
Jim Williams: Did this Plans and Analysis
Directorate act as a reviewer or a broker?
George Schecter: No, we were doers. We did
studies. The labs did studies also. We collabo-
rated. We were not adversarial. We completed
studies of our own and we collaborated with
labs on joint studies. We were sort of the Com-
manding Officer’s corporate future arm.
JimWilliams:At that point, then, you started
to deal with problems, as far as hardware goes,
in systems that went across the spectrum in the
Army.
George Schecter: That’s right, but I had done
that before, to some extent, also on a loan basis.
This is a jump to a different area. One day,
my boss said, ‘‘You’ve written a lot of technical
reports, and now I suggest that you divert
yourself to how do we store and retrieve that
information. The mountain of documents is
growing. There’s a lot of work being done that’s
repetitive and we don’t know it.’’ So he nudged
me into the scientific and technical information
storage and retrieval field. I spent about a seven-
or eight-year excursion there.
In fact, I published a book. One day a friend
of mine out at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Jim Taylor, called me and said, ‘‘I’m fluent in
Russian and I’m doing a study of how the So-
viets developed databases and apply them to
their decision processing. I’m reading this book
on information retrieval and the only English
words in it are your name. Explain yourself.’’
[Laughter] What happened is that they trans-
lated my book.
JimWilliams: Information Retrieval, is that the
full title?
George Schecter: Yes, Information Retrieval.
Gene Visco: They didn’t give you any royalty
for it, did they?
George Schecter: No. As a matter of fact on
mywife’s insistence I looked it up. At the time
they did it, we did not have an agreement
with them, and I’m not really very flattered
because they were translating everything,
particularly in that field because it was a
whole new field.
But anyway, it was a very interesting, very
useful excursion. One of the things we did
was to work with the people at the Walter Reed
Army Institute of Research, andwe decided that
there surely is a need for a storage, search and
retrieval system; no question. It will save a lot
of talent, a lot of time and a lot of dollars.
A small team, including me and the Army
Research Office in Washington, decided that of
all the fields, chemistry is the best documented
and the most symbolized field. So if we can’t
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do information retrieval on that, then we better
forget about the rest of the scientific fields.
So we decided to go into chemistry. We
worked with Walter Reed Army Institute of Re-
search and we developed the Army’s chemical
typewriter.
We found that there are about seven major
chemistry information storage and retrieval sys-
tems in the world, and each uses a different way
to find a substance and its properties. One of them
uses the name of the compound. Another uses the
formula of the compound. Another uses the non-
scientific name of the compound, and so forth.
We decided that we better surpass all of
those, and make a nonredundant, inexhaustible
method for finding a compound. At that time
there were something like 5,000 new com-
pounds beingdeveloped per year. So it’s a grow-
ing mass of information.
We decided that the nonredundant inex-
haustible way to do it is the molecular structure
itself. So with Walter Reed we developed a
typewriter that actually types the molecular
structure.
This is an indication of how early this was.
The storage medium at that time was a piece
of punched paper tape coming out of the bottom
of the typewriter. That was our best storage
medium.
It was a very interesting process. First of all,
we made a decision that if we didn’t get the
chemistry professional community involved,
we could develop the best system there is, and
it would be a white elephant and gather dust.
So we engaged the professional community
and there was a lot of resistance. Each chemist
in his little office had a three-by-five file that
was his personal treasure, and it was hard to
get them to relinquish that or to take steps to-
ward relinquishing that.
But it succeeded. It took a lot of hard work
and a lot of persuasion. But they are scientists,
too, although with personalities, and they were
given to understand the advantages to the coun-
try, to the field, and to them. It worked quite
well.
This was sort of an excursion, I don’t know
if you’d call that operational analysis or not. I
think it is.
Gene Visco:Did that project continue and ex-
tend into other areas?
George Schecter: Yes, into IACs, Information
Analysis Centers in the military, like SURVIAC
(Survivability Vulnerability Information Analy-
sis Center). We have a whole bunch of IACs. In
fact, I was the first so-called STINFO (Scientific
and Technical Information Officer) at Frankford
Arsenal.
We decided to institutionalize it, and I was
called ‘‘STINCO.’’ I was a pariah. But that sys-
tem still is very much in operation.
Jim Williams: When was that?
George Schecter: That would have started in
the middle 1960s. It was very exciting. There’s
that boss of mine who had the perception to
say, ‘‘There is a convergence. We have moun-
tains of data, mountains of reports and now
there’s a thing called a computer coming into
being. Get in there and make it work.’’
Jim Williams: Who was that?
George Schecter: Bill Kroeger, who was my
boss. That’s the kind of perception or leadership
that makes good things happen.
Gene Visco: You worked for him from the
early 1940s up through the 1960s? Over 20
years?
George Schecter: Yes.
Gene Visco: Was it a warm relationship?
George Schecter: Oh, yes.
Jim Williams: By that time, had the terms
‘‘operations research’’ or ‘‘operations analysis’’
become attached to the work that you were do-
ing or the positions that you were holding?
George Schecter:We did OR. We didn’t call it
that, but we simply did it. I was always regis-
tered and known and identified as a physicist,
never as an operations research analyst, right
up to today.
There’s an issue raised in here about the re-
lationship between the physical scientists and
OR/OA. I guess it’s pretty well known that all
of the early OR/OA people were scientists at
one time or another, and the question is asked,
‘‘What is that relationship?’’ Well, it’s the funda-
mental scientific method and the logic that goes
with science; if you’re awake it drives you to-
ward asking these questions and not just asking
them, but trying to answer them.
Jim Williams: Did you find that the people
whowere trained in the sciences and came from
a pure science background viewed the problems
in a different way from those people who have
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come through the pipeline that’s now been for-
malized as OR? Is there a difference in perspec-
tive as a result of those different paths?
George Schecter: I don’t think I can identify
any evidence of it. I think so and that may be
my bias, but I’ve never looked at it carefully
enough to answer that.
I was involved in another quite different
thing around 1966 or 1967. The idea occurred
to me that our techniques, our tactics, our force
structures, our systems might be inappropriate
for the threat they faced over there. I expanded
that to other things like our Military Assistance
Program in which we support third-world
countries. I read a few things and found that
at that time we seemed to be attempting to
equip and change the structure of third-world
military forces to be modeled after US military
forces, and it just struckme as downright dumb.
I wrote a little white paper, two or three
pages, that said, logically, what we ought to do
is determine what their threat is, not what they
say their threat is, but what the real threat to
their security is, to try to determine what oper-
ational capabilities are needed to defend against
that threat. Look at what instruments are
needed to carry out those operations, look at
what they have, look at what they lack. And
then I threw another wrinkle in that said, let’s
not give them a box of what they need. Let’s
see if we can help them to build or provide what
they need. The thought being that you don’t
make the best allies by giving them boxes of
stuff. You make the best allies by helping them
to become self-sufficient and independent.
I put down a six-point idea of how to
go about it. It took a year and finally, under
Project Agile, Leonard Sullivan, Deputy Di-
rector, Southeast Asia Matters, Office of Di-
rector of Defense Research and Engineering
(ODDR&E), in the middle of all his difficulties
handling what was going on in Southeast Asia,
he did give it a listen. In fact, we talked right
through lunch, and with all that he had to han-
dle I was surprised he said, ‘‘Okay. Let’s go.
Let’s get started.’’ The first thing he did was
to send me to Colombia, South America to look
at the threat. What is the threat?
The reason I emphasize that is that nations,
their leaders, and their military leaders tend to
want super-sophisticated stuff that they can
neither use nor maintain or defeat the enemy
with, because it’s hot stuff. That’s not a very
good reason to provide military assistance.
Rather than try to identify the whole threat,
the US Government people there and our Mili-
tary Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG), said
we have a very particular problem in this valley.
There is a highly organized, almost military
force, that’s running things in that valley. They
gang up on a ranch and have their way. There’s
no way that that ranch can resist the over-
whelming odds that they bring against them.
The USMAAG people were compiling lists.
They showed me their lists. They were compil-
ing lists of choppers, jeeps, mortars, machine
guns, etc., to equip their forces in this area. Up
to that point none of these things had an effect
and they were simply doing more of the same.
This was not just me. This is a team of about
four guys. The team was composed of people
from various services, service organizations
within the US, civilians andmyself. At that time
I was still with the Army at Frankford Arsenal.
We decided to look at this threat on site. But
of course you can’t see the threat. All you can
see is the terrain and the distribution of our po-
lice units and the ranches. One of the team
members got the idea that we ought to equip
these ranches with radio communications sys-
tems so that if ranch A is under attack, ranches
B and C can call for help, or ranch A can call
for help from B and C. And if you still can’t
equalize against the odds, you can call other
ranches. We suggested to make it compatible
with the police forces so the police can be
brought in. So in ever-widening rings you could
bring in local police, national police, and the
military.
The system was installed and it worked.
These bandit forces were so highly organized
that they had shoulder patches, uniforms and
so forth. They were a quasimilitary force.
The Project Agile people were pretty happy
with the result. Then they sent the same team
over to Ethiopia. The problem there was the cul-
ture difference that we did not fully compre-
hend when we got there. Each morning we
would deal with point one, which is ‘‘What’s
the threat?’’ And there would be a lot of discus-
sion and we wouldn’t really get a description of
the real threat. Then they would lead us down
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the path toward eight of these APCs (armored
personnel carriers) and 12 of these tanks and
two of these airplanes. And the next morning
we would start again to discuss ‘‘What’s the
threat?’’ and the process was repeated again
and again.
So we used my idea. The culture was such
that, a respondent might say ‘‘Yes,’’ but doesn’t
mean ‘‘Yes’’ and we just didn’t recognize it. We
decided to compromise our six-point sequence
and go to something fairly simple. I went to
our embassy and I went to their commercial bu-
reau, and I went through a lot of lists that
showed what their military imported and from
whom they imported it.
I also went to their agriculture people and
learned that they were making investments in
certain areas. I found a convergence of canvas
goods—and I found from the list that they im-
port all of their military canvas goods, boots,
tents, belts, knapsacks, whatever. I learned from
their agriculture people that they were making
substantial investments in their cotton agricul-
ture and I also found from other commercial
people that they were making investments in
their textile industry.
The thought occurred to me that, let’s help
them get over the hump by bringing some tex-
tile technologists over, see what the shortfall is
betweenwhat their quality requirement is, what
their production is, and how we can overcome
that gap.
Several companies in the US were coopera-
tive and sent people over. It took several years,
but the project succeeded. We did the similar
thing there with tire recapping. They had a very
primitive tire recapping capability, and yet their
military did not recap internally. They did it in
some other country.
Again, we tried to define what the shortfall
was andwewere able to bring over some rubber
tire technology people to help them close that
gap. The whole notion of doing it this way
was to have a confidence-building success.
Jim Williams: Within the nation?
George Schecter: Within the nation, within
Ethiopia to gain their goodwill. I didn’t care how
small the success was, we just needed to have
a success that they would recognize as useful.
That took so long that I was out of it by the
time anything happened. But it’s hard to believe
this coincidence. About five years later I was on
a plane going out to Rock Island, Illinois, and sat
next to a fellowwithwhom I got into a conversa-
tion. I mentioned nothing about this project and
he very excitedly told me he was returning to
base from Ethiopia where he had been running
the project that I had started. [Laughter]Can you
believe that?
Jim Williams: This was a US fellow?
George Schecter: Yes. He was just coming
back from being over there for years.
Jim Williams: Were both the Colombian and
Ethiopian initiatives run under Project Agile?
George Schecter: They were both Project
Agile. As amatter of fact, I wasn’t selecting any-
thing. They were just handed to me.
The next country was Iran, and things got
too violent and that was called off. But to me
that would have been a prime example of the
principle, namely, provide a lot of the most
highly sophisticated weapons and get beaten
by rocks and clubs. Is that a far-stretched
conclusion?
A good example of my early work in OR
was Military Operations in Built-Up Areas
(MOBA). I became interested in that in the
mid-1960s. It was a trivial, unrecognized, un-
wanted area for a long time. I started to look
at the maps and had fairly good knowledge of
our tactics and doctrine and systems, and it be-
came clear to me that they were simply ignoring
the fact that Europe is becoming wall-to-wall
built-up areas. They did nothing in the way of
design or requirements or testing that took that
environment into account.
I guess you would call that OA. I struggled
with that for 10 years to get it recognized.
JimWilliams:What level did you talk to peo-
ple to get a sensitivity to that?
George Schecter: Gee, every level. At first I
talked to people down in the ranks, to learn
whether I was barking up the wrong tree or
not, and then I just kept climbing up. I briefed
people like the four-star boss of Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), at that
time Bill DePuy (General William E. DePuy).
We became friends.
Jim Williams: Did he seem to be responsive?
George Schecter: He became very responsive
to it. The first thing that happened that started
to institutionalize it was that the Defense
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Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
became interested and started a project to look
into it. In fact, therewas aguyup there, Lieutenant
Colonel Ray Franklin, a Marine at DARPA at
the time, and he was the project officer. In
1971, I bid on and won a contract to support
that project.
As a matter of fact, Gene just reminded me
that I initiated a MORS working group on
MOBA. The importance of it to me is that I
was challenging the tactics, doctrine, planning,
force structuring, equipment requirements, test-
ing, across the board. Because conducting mili-
tary operations in a built-up area is a very
different kind of an operation and things that
work out in the plains just don’t work in
a built-up area, and vice versa.
Anyway, DARPA became interested and ini-
tiated a project and that ran for about two-and-a-
half to three years. It was during that period that
I briefed General DePuy and lots of people, lots
of general officers. It was a constant grind to
get this accepted. Some of the old generalswould
say, ‘‘American ingenuity will take care of every-
thing.’’ and I would say, ‘‘Nonsense!’’ [Laughter]
But really, that’s a lot of the response I got. DePuy
really was the guy who recognized it.
As a matter of fact, he rewrote FM 100-5Op-
erations of Army Forces in the Field. They asked
me to help write the chapter on military opera-
tions in built-up areas. They were mean to me.
They told me what they wanted and they stuck
me in the Strawberry Banks Motel and said,
‘‘Wewant you back here at noon tomorrowwith
a chapter.’’ [Laughter] That was a good experi-
ence. I really got along very well with the officer
community. I never spruced them; I was just
straightforward with them.
Of course, that has now been institutional-
ized. I see it every day almost. I see require-
ments being prepared or published and the
requirements say, ‘‘must be capable of operation
and effective in built-up areas.’’
Looking back at MOBA, the things that
were lacking, in my opinion and that of many
others, were not only in the tactics, techniques,
organization, and system requirements, but also
in training. It is a very strange environment in
which to conduct combat operations, and one
of the things that we battled for was to have
a training facility that would be appropriate.
There was a German training facility. The
Germans did it in a very simple way. They
bought a town and turned it into a training facil-
ity. It’s a fact. But then we had one built in
Berlin. It was called Doughboy City for a while,
and it started with about eight or nine buildings
and now has grown to something like 38 build-
ings. These are concrete shells with interior
stairs and exterior windows and doors. I
worked with the engineers and helped in the
design of it. I wanted to be sure that, for exam-
ple, there was a T-intersection somewhere in
the plan, that there was an X-intersection some-
where in the plan, that there were some dead
ends in the plan, that there were courtyards
within building structured areas. That was my
contribution to the overall design so that the
whole range of tactical engagement conditions
would be represented.
These buildings are from one to five stories
high and they are pretty indestructible concrete.
They did some very realistic training. They’d
run cars into the village. They’d burn them.
They’d pile them up as obstacles. They burned
tires in the buildings to get some very realistic
effects. It has been used for some time now to
put all infantry units through as a part of
their overall training. It’s not just for the Berlin
Brigade.
Gene Visco: Is there a name that they use for
that town?
George Schecter: It was called Doughboy
City. In fact, I went there several times. They
made me a coffee cup with the French, British,
and US logos on it and they made me an
honorary member of the brigade. I took the
coffee mug home because I think it’s now a
collectible.
Later, MOBA became Military Operations
in Urban Terrain (MOUT).
Gene Visco: It’s always bothered me because
I couldn’t quite imagine terrain being part of
MOBA.
George Schecter: Yes, we thought very care-
fully when we decided on the name. A built-
up area can be a road strip with a lot of
buildings on either side.
Jim Williams: That acronym MOBA became
MOUT?
George Schecter: Some general, I think it was
General Donn Starry came in and changed it.
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Gene Visco: That would have been in the
middle 1970s.
George Schecter: That’s about when it was
changed.
Jim Williams: Obviously you knew a lot
about military tactics. How did you acquire
your knowledge of tactics?
George Schecter: During the time when I was
a civil servant, the system there was very good
to me. They sent me to schools. They sent me
to military schools. The courses were two-week,
three-week, and four-week courses. And, of
course, I did a lot of reading. In those courses,
I sat side by side with officers and got the same
material they got and that just familiarized me
with what that was all about.
There’s another area that I was very much
involved in for a while and that is countermea-
sure (CM) and counter-countermeasure (CCM)
analysis. It seems tome like that is a combination
of the application of science and the application
of OA. I’ve done a number of them.
An example is better than a generality. I did
the CM and CCM analysis of the sensor sys-
tem for Project Sense and Destroy ARMor
(SADARM), the artillery-launched munition
that expels some number of bodies. Each body
comes down on a little parachute, scans and
senses and attacks armor. We had to do it from
the standpoint of physics. What are the signa-
tures? What are the sensors and processors?
What are the likely CMs? There are some things
as simple as smoke and dust and so forth.
We did a thorough job. We looked at the So-
viet technology, their capability to develop and
produce these various CMs against that sensor
sitting up there. We invented for them a little
box that you could put on the top of a Soviet
tank that would simply swamp the sensor that
was looking for my red tank. I used a term
called ‘‘plausibility.’’ In fact in all of the CM
and CCM reports that I’ve written, one of the
things I put up front is ‘‘because a system can
be countermeasured in the laboratory is not nec-
essarily a reason not to develop that system.’’
In this particular case we declared this CM,
this little box, to be technically feasible, doable
by the Soviets, but tactically implausible.
Why? Because we recognized their doctrine of
operational silence, and this radiation coming
out of this box would broadcast their presence,
plus the fact that it could become a beacon
upon which some other sensor would attack
that target.
It’s just common sense and simple logic
that, ‘‘yes, this CM would work, but they ain’t
going to use it’’ was our declaration. Another il-
lustration of what I mean by OA.
JimWilliams: It sounds likewhat you’re talk-
ing about is a logical process. It’s a matter of
looking at the problem, what would be the im-
mediate response to that, but if you responded
that way, then what came next and next.
Gene Visco: That’s why it’s CM and CCM.
Jim Williams: Is there a distinction between
people who are trained in the sciences and their
view of CMs?
George Schecter: I don’t think so. In fact, it
could be the reverse. The guy who is really bent
on developing a system is doing the best that he
knows how to do it, and he’s concentrating on
that and he has to be jarred into thinking of CMs.
In fact, the Army wrote a regulation that
says you will. I don’t think that ability or incli-
nation to look at it that way comes just from
a scientific point of view—you apply the science
to look at the other side of it, but it may be the
reverse. I think CM and CCM is an operational
analysis force requirement.
On the same subject, I did a very extensive
CM and CCM analysis of mines. It was a way
to make it graphically comprehensible and yet
very exhaustive. I did it for the designers of
mines. I’ll show you.
Mine CM and CCMwas really a report that
Picatinny wanted for their mine design people.
What do you have to look for when you design
a mine in the way of CMs and what can you do
to toughen those CMs.
What I did was to visualize three columns.
In the first column is a step-by-step set of the
functions of a mine. I call it: ‘‘The Mine, This is
Your Life!’’ It could start by getting kicked out
of an airplane and drops or it gets kicked out
of an artillery shell and drops. It impacts the
ground. It’s supposed to do something when it
impacts the ground. It senses the approach of
a target, and so forth. I don’t need to go through
all of them. You know that eventually it says,
‘‘Go bang, you’ve got a target.’’ Or a target never
shows up, so after six hours or whatever time
period it is, it blows itself up.
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There is a complete functional description
of every step that it goes through. In the second
column is: ‘‘What does the environment do that
is discouraging to each of those steps?’’ And,
‘‘What does an enemy do that is frustrating to
each of those steps?’’ You can draw a line be-
tween one of the functions in column one and
several counter-things that happen in column
two.
Then you construct column three and it
says: ‘‘Given that it’s raining, that’s the environ-
ment, or given that the mine wants to magneti-
cally sense the presence of a tank target, what
can you do about that?’’ How can the enemy
counter each? Now from the second column
from each of those CM things, you may have
some number of CCMs hardening against that.
It was just a method that I had not seen, and
it really worked very well. I made a very com-
plex set of conditions easy to follow. A young
engineer could look at this and find himself in
his issue there.
Gene Visco: When was it?
George Schecter: 1979.
Jim Williams: And the title of that study?
George Schecter: ‘‘Mine/Countermine/Better
Mine.’’ Oh, gee, I blush. [Laughter]
This remindsme of something else that I got
pretty excited about, and it’s called the Tactical
Deterrent Effects Model (Tactical Deterrent Ef-
fects Model; George Schecter, James C. Richards,
and Henry A. Romberg). It got initiated from
the standpoint of a mine, but I think it may
be applicable to other things.
In other words, when you deploy a mine-
field inwarfare, what it produces are some casu-
alties, but also some behavior on the part of the
enemy, and those are related in some uncertain
way.
What I did was to construct a curve in
which the ordinate is the value of the mission
to be accomplished, and then on the other co-
ordinate is the commander’s estimate of the
remaining force requirement to accomplish the
mission, his estimate.
You can havemissions ranging in value from
zero to one, where onemeans the world will end
and the United States will die or the mission will
not be accomplished. You have the full range,
and then you have against that the remaining
force in terms of a fraction, a percentage of the
force remaining. So it’s one minus the casualties
you can tolerate.
If you draw a line between one and themax-
imum value of the force requirement, just draw
a straight line and call that risk-neutral and then
a bowed concave down and a bowed concave
up reaching the same points at both ends would
be risk-averse and risk-seeking. [Editor’s note: A
graph illustrating this concept is on page 433 of the
MORS report Human Behavior and Perfor-
mance as Essential Ingredients in RealisticMod-
eling of Combat, MORIMOC II, Volume 2, 1989,
in a paper titled ‘‘Tactical Deterrent Effects Model’’
by Schecter, Richards and Romberg.]
The thing that pushed me toward it is, I ran
across a study that had been done of military
people, officers and enlisted, in which they de-
termined their risk characteristics in a clinical
environment. Outside of the military there’s
a great deal of work on risk behavior, and the
military work is prettymuch like the other work
that’s going on.
The important part is that there is a popula-
tion distribution among risk-neutral, risk-averse,
and risk-seeking. That’s pretty uncertain. There
are different judgments as to what that popula-
tion distribution is. But this clinical study ar-
rived at some distribution among those three
categories, and it just seemed to me that if you
used that as a guide by which to estimate the
breakoff of contact between the enemy and us
and our minefield, you might get a handle on
what affect the minefield is having other than
casualty production.
I took an old model, a combat simulation,
and superimposed this on it. We ran the simula-
tion and it showed that, given that our forces
were operating on some basis of casualties toler-
able, if at the early part of the engagement there
were fairly heavy casualties, the estimate pointed
toward failure of the mission and the enemy
broke off.We ran it past that point, andwe found
that if he had persisted he would have won.
It was pretty exciting, and I don’t know if
anybody has done anything since, but it seemed
like it would apply to mines and their effects,
but it would apply to other things too.
JimWilliams: I’m curious how this particular
project came about.
George Schecter: This occurred when I was
out of the Army Civil Service, and I was with
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. GEORGE SCHECTER, FS
Military Operations Research, V20 N3 2015 Page 85
a study group and simply talked to the people at
Picatinny. I didn’t have to point out to them that
mines have both effects. They do produce casu-
alties, but they must have psychological effects
or deterrent effects or suppression. They call it
all kinds of words, but they had no numbers.
So they were willing to put some funding into
it and let me take a crack at it. The first time
around I only produced the conceptual model,
and then the second time I found data of those
clinical experiments. I also found that Dorothy
Clark at the Army Operations Research Office
(ORO) had done a study of break points, and I
picked that up and, by golly, there just seemed
to be good agreement.
Gene Visco: What was the name of the orga-
nization that you went to?
George Schecter:Analytics, Inc., SteveLiebholtz
and Company.
That’s what was really exciting. Though
when I looked at a lot of literature, I felt very
lucky to have found the clinical studies of mili-
tary people’s risk behavior. And then I found
Dorothy Clark’s stuff and it just seemed to all
fit together.
Another thing that I learned both from the
Army studies, and from all of the other civilian
studies, is that the risk characteristics of a guy
stay with him regardless of whether he’s facing
marriage or divorce or war. That doesn’t mean
that he takes the same risks for different stakes,
but if he’s risk-averse, he will be risk-averse in
every situation. That’s what I got out of the liter-
ature. That is a characteristic of a person and,
therefore, the distribution is a characteristic of
a population.
Gene Visco:When did you first get involved
in mine warfare? Was that after Frankford?
George Schecter: No, I don’t think so.
Gene Visco: The reason I’m asking the ques-
tion is that you can’t jump into this sort of think-
ing about this logical structure construct. You
need to have some fundamental knowledge of
a mine before you can do that, I suspect.
George Schecter: You don’t need to know
anything about a mine for it to be a method to
represent a fairly complex set of conditions.
Simply and easily comprehensible, I think.
Jim Williams: It sounds like a commonality
to a lot of your work is essentially organization
and representation. You’re looking at a complex
situation, identifying key elements, and then
figuring out some kind of a structure to repre-
sent those relationships.
I’m wondering how that ties back to your
background in physics, because one of the char-
acteristics of physics is its reduction of a prob-
lem to its simplest components and then some
representation of that.
GeorgeSchecter:Well, usually amathematical
representation. My mathematics is not that ad-
vanced and I don’t think I ever did anything
substantial in the way of a mathematical repre-
sentation. So, that’s my confession. [Laughter]
I think that’s a fact and that’s why these are
the things that excite me and make me feel pro-
ductive. In other words, the attitude I take is if
you can’t present it to a person who is going
to make decisions about it, you’re losing the
end point.
Gene Visco: So you looked for ways of visu-
alizing the problem in a construct that allows
people to look at it and say, ‘‘Yes, I think I under-
stand the process.’’
George Schecter: And I can do something
about that. If you don’t have an effect, then to
what avail?
Jim Williams: One of the things in common
with different people in OR seems to be the
desire to see an end result, to see a change
in behavior.
George Schecter: Yes, I’m not sure the whole
community feels that way. I’m sure some part
revels in the elegance of the solution. That’s
okay.
Gene Visco: You said you found data that de-
scribed groups of people. Did you ever find any
data to the effect that whatever pattern is set in
an individual, generally speaking, that’s a pat-
tern they follow regardless of the environment?
George Schecter: That’s their characteristic.
Gene Visco: So that led you to say that if you
were risk-averse in the laboratory, then you’d be
risk-averse in society and perhaps in war.
George Schecter: Correct.
Gene Visco: Did you ever find any informa-
tion to confirm this?
George Schecter: Yes. In fact, some years later,
I came across work by Amos Tversky. He’s
a prolific author and worked in the human risk
behavior business. I remember turning over the
pages of Fortune magazine and coming upon
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a graph just like mine. He didn’t copy mine,
don’t misunderstand me; he dealt with civil
matters, not military. But I found that to be
pervasive in the whole field of risk behavior
characterization.
Gene Visco: Utility theory is related to this,
isn’t it?
George Schecter: I guess.
Gene Visco: I notice you have decision work
by Howard Raiffa (Games and Decisions: Intro-
duction and Critical Survey by Luce and Raiffa).
He deals with this to some degree.
George Schecter: I guess he does. I’ve given
copies of that book away by the dozens.
Gene Visco:When did you first hear the term
‘‘operations analysis’’?
George Schecter: It could be when I joined
MORS actively, maybe earlier.
Gene Visco: It might have occurred in part
when you came across Dorothy Clark’s work.
George Schecter: Yes.
This DARPA contract that I won was in
1971. It was my first contract as a non-civil ser-
vant. Initially I was with Ketron, Incorporated
when we won that contract. I was with them
for five years. In fact, it seems to be five-year cy-
cles. Five years Ketron, five years McLean Re-
search in McLean, Virginia, and maybe I’ll do
that at Battelle—about five years. It takes that
long to catch on. This is a wonderful place to
work, just great.
I was remembering a couple of things. One
of the things I did 5, 6, 7 years agowas a compar-
ative evaluation of various missile system im-
provements. We very recently did a thing on
the importance of environmental effects on
weapon performance for the Navy. Way back I
did some human factors engineering work.
Jim Williams: You had mentioned you had
made some notes about the profession of OR.
George Schecter: Yes. The question about
how important was the idea of a profession in
the early days of my career and why. I’m not
thinking just about OR, but that’s one of the
things that my bosses and colleagues endowed
to me, that being professional was just about
the best thing in the world, that it gave you
a sense of purpose. It gave you a pleasure of ac-
complishment, excitement of accomplishment,
excitement of being part of a community. It
remained a very important aspect of my life.
Jim Williams: Did your bosses and the peo-
ple you worked with define the community of
professionals?
George Schecter:No. Professional, as defined
by Webster, is something to which you devote
your life, that simple a definition; and that
you’re not an amateur, that you’re expected to
do good, clean, healthy, productive work. It
seems so simple. I think it’s something that’s
not vanishing, but it’s less prevalent today.
Jim Williams:What they emphasized wasn’t
any particular community, it was just the notion
of high-quality work and a broad concept of ser-
vice to the community.
George Schecter: Just that. Sure. It wasn’t
done in a lecture forum. It wasn’t done in fancy
language. It was done in very plain English.
‘‘Look, George, you have to get such and such
done by Tuesday and report to the team. That’s
your obligation.’’ It was a pleasure.
JimWilliams: But therewasn’t any particular
discipline, for example, the fact that you were
a physicist or you were an operations research
person?
George Schecter: Not at all. There were, you
might say, nonprofessional technicians who
were required to do and behave the same way,
and received it as an obligation that they were
happy to have. It wasn’t an elitist thing at all.
Everybody was part of the team.
Jim Williams: You talked about the different
projects and the kind of problems that you
worked on and the range of things over the
years. It strikes me that there’s been a tremen-
dous diversity. Your approach to things has
been, for lack of a better word, eclectic.
George Schecter: Oh, I think eclectic is the
spice of life. [Laughter]Variety is the spice of life.
I enjoy variety and I seek these things out. Some-
times they seek me out. You only get one time
around, do everything you can.
There’s a downside to that too and that is, I
probably have not made anymajor contribution
to developing or inventing a methodology, and
maybe this is my substitute for that.
Jim Williams: It sounds like it’s been highly
productive.
George Schecter: I feel that way.
Jim Williams: Looking at the kinds of work
that you’ve done, is there a track there that folks
can follow?
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George Schecter: I think the important track
for me, and maybe for some arm of the profes-
sion, is to be damned sure that you get a real-
world result implemented. That’s a great
satisfaction to me. I was just saying that maybe
there’s a downside of that, and that is I probably
have not developed a real improvement in OR
methodology.
Jim Williams: Do you think those people
who have made a name in improved methodol-
ogy are in any sense more productive?
George Schecter: I think they’remore produc-
tive in that their methodology can be applied to
many problems inmost cases. Sure, that’s an ex-
tremely valuable thing. It just may be a thin spot
in my capability.
Gene Visco: The notion of the guy who in-
vents the shovel may never turn a spade full
of earth, but a lot of spades full of earth get
turned. Any one of those other spades-full
may be worth the development of the shovel.
George Schecter: Sure.
Gene Visco: I wouldn’t decry the fact that
neither one of us made a contribution to the
tools for operations analysis, but in some ways
we had other impacts.
George Schecter: I feel that way.
Gene Visco: You’ve come around full circle.
At the outset you were talking about contribut-
ing to things that were in fact implemented. The
actions were taken, decisions weremade, things
were done, and things were built. You’ve come
around to point that out as being one of the great
satisfactions, seeing the implementation of the
results. I’m with you that the analysis is not
done until some action occurs.
George Schecter: Yes, that’s not in any sense
to minimize the value of people who get results
and people who develop better tools, not at all.
The whole profession depends on that. That’s
one of the things that I missed. I started out in
hardware R&D and the big satisfaction was
a product that went to the field, and that the sol-
diers used very effectively.
I slipped over into the OR area and I missed
that end product satisfaction. Or the other way
around, I was so used to the end product satis-
faction that I went after it and that may explain
this kind of eclecticism.
Jim Williams: You’ve been in the active seek-
ing mode, to use an analogy to radar weapons
systems. What I see is a pattern here of always
looking around, expecting that there’s some-
thing going to pop up and responding to it.
George Schecter: A good example might be
that tactical deterrent effects thing. The question
that was put to me was, we know that mines
produce some attrition, but there’s a whole
bunch of other things that mines produce and
we don’t know what the heck they are. They
are psychological, they are deterrent, et cetera.
As a matter of fact, when you look at it in
terms of attrition, it’s hard to justify the cost of
them. That’s the way the problem was pre-
sented and I started to read psychological ab-
stracts and some psychology books and
reports of combat. I didn’t know that I would
have any solution. They trusted me enough to
know that if I tried, at least when I was done,
they would know that maybe it can’t be done.
They were willing to take that risk.
You can know from combat experience,
from records, from history that mines are very
important implements of war, and yet we make
investments and there is a disparity in those in-
vestments. When we invest in an antitank
weapon or an improvement to an antitank
weapon, it goes zap and bang and it kills a tank
and you count them.
A mine sits there and waits, but it has very
big effects that can’t be quantified. In a sense it
was the corporate self-interest on the people
who wanted me to do it. They wanted to be able
to justify the value of this implement of war.
We knew that it was psychological and just
kept searching for a way to try to quantify, and
some place I ran across Tversky, but the busi-
ness of risk behavior and distribution of risk
characteristics in a population just seemed to
feel right. I was very lucky and I ran across this
Army clinical test and then the idea of combin-
ing this with a combat simulation, a casualty
model and overlaying it. And then the real
payoff was Dorothy Clark’s work, which fit
right in.
I hope I’m not idealizing what actually hap-
pened there.
Jim Williams: One thing I’d like to ask as
a follow-on to that. Are you an avid reader?
George Schecter: Yes, I read. I don’t know if
avid, but I read quite a bit. I read a lot in the pro-
fessional literature.
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Jim Williams: Is that something you enjoy
doing?
George Schecter: Yes. And I listen to people
and I talk with people and I swap problems
and ideas with people.
On this same project now, one of the other
things that I looked into was Marion Bryson
(another MORS Fellow), who did a series of
suppression experiments out at the Combat
Developments Experimentation Center (CDEC).
This was a series of experiments done to try to
get a handle on quantifying suppressive effects
of firepower. Firepowerdoes two kinds of things:
it kills and it suppresses. To try to get a handle
on that was analogous to noncasualty effects of
mines. I looked at that pretty carefully and they
did a good job. I just couldn’t see how to use it,
so I went and looked elsewhere.
Jim Williams: Was there anything else?
George Schecter: I really can’t overemphasize
the effect MORS had. I don’t knowwhy I joined.
I think there was a meeting at a very attractive
place. [Laughter] When I started to attend those
meetings and started to learn how systemati-
cally it can be done and how it was evolving
and developing and burgeoning, I just got
addicted. I didn’t miss a meeting for 20 years.
Jim Williams:What did MORS give you that
you felt like you didn’t have before?
George Schecter: It gave me a notion of just
how many methodologies there are around
out there. It gaveme a network for finding them.
It gave me a network for discussing getting
help.
I got seduced by MORS and then loved it,
and I just got more and more interested. In fact,
I became very active and I did everything. I was
the chairman of this and chairman of that. I al-
ways presented a paper.
Jim Williams: I’d like to ask one more ques-
tion. I see you have a picture from Alice in Won-
derland—Through the Looking Glass on your wall,
of the Mad Hatter at the tea party. Is there a spe-
cific connection with that?
George Schecter: Just that Alice in Wonderland
has my favorite quote.
Jim Williams: ‘‘When I use a word it means
just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor
less.’’
George Schecter: Just a whimsy.
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